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elements of this culture have converged at once, existing in the international community
and what this means for international security moving forward. The paper will look at a
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affected the use of mercenaries. Building on this, it will then address the current structure
of the privatization of conflicts through news media, autobiographies, and a host of other
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cycle of mercenary use remains present in international conflict and what this means for
the future of international security.
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INTRODUCTION

The mercenary has been tied to military history as far back as the early Greek and
Roman civilizations, and this history has been interwoven with conflict since the concept
of monetary economies was a glimmer of an idea. While mercenaries go back further
than the Middle Ages, it was not until this period that the mercenary identity or tradition
came to resemble a form as it is now recognized. Over time, this identity became blurred
with the concept of private contractors that became a staple of later evolutions of the
cycle.
As their use progressed through time, the generally accepted definition of a
mercenary changed in relation to the political atmosphere of the international community.
Using the words of former Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel, “The same word
can, at one moment, radiate great hope; at another, it can emit lethal rays. The same word
can be true at one moment and false the next, at one moment illuminating, at another
deceptive.”1 It is in this nature that a single definition would be deceptive in nature, as
the use of terminology has been dictated by behavior and semantics over time. For this
reason, the U.N. legal definition contained within the Protocol Additional I to the Geneva
Convention, 1977 will be the primary nomenclature of classification for the general
discussion of mercenaries, but to apply this definition ex post facto, or retroactively, to
historical groups would be an insult to history.
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The consensus definition of mercenarism arrived at by the international
community in Article 47 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention, 1977 has an
expanded nature, and states:
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.
2. A mercenary is any person who:
a. is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed
conflict;
b. does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
c. is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces of that Party;
d. is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a Party to the conflict;
e. is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
f. has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on
official duty as a member of its armed forces.2
This definition of mercenary as we know it is a modern construct, coming out of the idea
of foreignness as it relates to describing soldiers and groups that were different from the
native forces raised for war. The basic elements that define mercenaries are not
independent of each other, but instead the convergence of variables, including
motivation, payment, and this concept of foreignness. The idea of motivation is a
complex one in looking at the evolution of the mercenary identity, because at times the
drivers for participation in a conflict outside of the normal bounds of engagement have
included religion and political ideology, with payment being part of the underlying
motives.
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The use of mercenaries by political factions, groups, and later states can be
loosely tied to economics over time. The connection between economics and mercenary
use is a result of the transactional basis of military service in war, and the costs associated
with raising forces, in both logistical and material terms. Economic history is tied to this
understanding as war and conflict represented a motivation for profit and the markets for
force over time. The use of mercenaries has at times been more prevalent in history
when economies have either been at the height of their growth or in downswings after
larger conflicts ended and soldiers sought continued income outside the perceived regular
channels of military service in the public sphere.
Over time the use of mercenaries developed as part of the wider advances in
military strategy and philosophy. As much of the historical record of their use is within
the traditional European development of military conduct and warfare, focus has been
devoted to this viewpoint for much of the earlier historiography. The fracturing of
regional centers of power at the end of the Classical Period is partly to blame in
attributing the cycle to primarily the European societies.
Much as international norms developed over time dictating the conduct of
warfare, mercenary use has shaped culture throughout history. Auxiliary forces for much
of history represented the prime areas of mercenary use, as armies co-opted or contracted
out specialized tasks to persons with expertise and later integrated these groups into the
larger society. In similar fashion, innovation was at times driven by and directly related
to the conduct of war, such as with the early uses of iron for military means and the
development of chariots and specialized shipbuilding.3 Use of mercenary, and by
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extension private, force also helped shape societal norms, from economics to political and
legal views of the world. The story of the Ten Thousand, a Greek mercenary army
formed the basis of Xenophon’s Anabasis in ancient times, representing one of the first
novels in history, and helped shape the formation of literature.4 As their use has extended
from the beginning of recorded history, mercenaries have been interwoven into the
frameworks of culture as it is seen now. This portrayal has shifted with time from the
romanticized Medieval knights and paid men to modern soldiers of fortune and the
increasingly privatized military industry.
This cyclical nature of widespread use has shaped the identity of those classified
as mercenaries, as the rich history provides countless examples to choose from when
analyzing the shift to the current depiction and use. The current security climate in
international relations has signaled a possible upswing in this cycle, while also witnessing
a revolution in military affairs as many of the historical qualities and elements have
converged in a singular point. The limited defining qualities of the mercenary in
international law make this revolution in military affairs more pronounced, as states
begin to cede the monopoly on use of force to private actors, as seen in the Middle East
and Africa in recent years.
Within the current conditions in international security, a range of armed non-state
actors are present in conflicts around the world, with the private sector making up a
significant percentage of these groups. The normalization of acceptance of these
privatized actors in conflict helps to illustrate the competitive self-interests of states to
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disregard or play coy the legal norms against use. These competitive self-interests
portray the realist ideals of the anarchical international system within international
relations, as states have begun to cede the monopoly on force back to private actors as the
world becomes more globalized.

5

THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF USE

The mercenary experience in history has been of a cyclical nature, as widespread
use was affected by a number of economic and political factors, which created a state of
being that fluctuated in regards to the needs of the markets of force within conflict and
foreign relations. This cyclical nature of use illustrates these shifting markets of force
over time, with the peaks and valleys of widespread conflict and intervening periods of
mercenary engagement. Mercenaries and other forms of privatized actors were part of
the routine aspect of international relations prior to the twentieth century.5 While not all
privatized actors are mercenaries, the tradition of private military industry came out of
the use of mercenaries over time. This section looks at this evolution of these privatized
actors and how the concept of the markets for force were shaped by the use of both
foreign and internal groups for the conduct of conflict.

Classical Period
During the classical period of history, focused in interlocking civilizations and
empires of the Greeks and later Rome, mercenary use was tied to the auxiliary units of
the armies of these civilizations. Many of these early factions were built on economic
power and regional trade, which coupled with the expanding colonization presented a
political disposition that pitted them against each other as they expanded around the
Mediterranean. While economic considerations were not the only motivating influence in
conflicts between city-states, the economic bases of these ancient empires laid in the
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tribute and taxation that could be acquired from conquest.6 Thus, conflict was tied early
on to markets as there was a correlation between trade, production and the value of force.
As trading factions and empires expanded in the Mediterranean basin, these
factions looked to outside militant groups and non-citizen subjects to support their
growing armies. The early examples of this outside sourcing came from the city-states of
the early Aegean Sea basin, as the Greek city-states fought continued wars against each
other and the Persian Empire. The hoplite armies of the Greek city-states were made up
of primarily ordinary citizen soldiers who had been drafted, wherein the citizenshiporiented nature of armies drove the defense of the polis, or the political community of
free men.7 In periods of extended warfare between the city-states, the composition of
armies shifted from the small semi-standing hoplite forces to include auxiliaries of
cavalry and archers that supplemented these forces.
The auxiliary units of much of the ancient world were drawn from a mix of
peoples from outlying territories and neighboring factions. Distinguishing specific
mercenary auxiliaries during this period is difficult, as one of the modern defining
characteristics of mercenaries is citizenship, which covered only a small minority of
populations during this period. For instance, the Romans used two nontechnical terms to
denote a mercenary, conducticius and miles mercenarius, and the meaning depended on
the context.8 Other groups, and even Rome, lumped these forces in with other auxiliaries
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at times, with the Romans later referring to paid foreigners serving in their armies as
foederati.
The use of mercenaries and contracted soldiers in this region represents some of
the earliest recorded use of private force as supplement for military action and established
the general principle that contracted military service was an accepted norm of the period.
One of the earliest novels, Xenophon’s Anabasis, is the recounting of the Greek
mercenary army of the Ten Thousand’s travels through Persia during a civil war between
brothers.9 It is from this episode that later groups could base their reasoning for use and
illustrates that there is a cultural aspect to the historical use of privatized military force.
Many of these auxiliary units became specialized detachments over time, as they
developed certain skill sets in conflict that made them attractive acquisitions for the
factions and empires which employed these groups. This held especially true in the case
of Carthage, wherein the Carthaginians had constructed a base army composed of citizensoldiers making up the ranks of infantry for the main army, while outsourcing specialized
services that they lacked expertise in. Carthage saw the benefits and costs of hired armies
and contract warfare, as the failure of the city-state to pay its forces at the end of the First
Punic War (264-241 B.C.E.) led to revolts in what was known as the Mercenary War.10
Even after the Mercenary War, the city-state continued use of private groups, as generals
such as Hannibal needed forces that the state could not provide independently for
expansion. Hannibal had learned firsthand from his father the importance of paying
mercenaries, and while in Spain he “carefully acquired the best possible army of trained
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soldiers – on the one hand, buying the loyalty of some veteran mercenaries; and on the
other, offering other mercenaries the opportunity to share loot from the Spanish
conquests.”11 Hannibal utilized the specialization of these hired forces to buffer his
troops in his later expedition into Italy, allowing him to have a well-trained army that was
loyal to him and not the politics of factions that may have disagreed with his actions.
The important factor of the mercenary tradition that came out of this period was
the idea that citizenship was tied to military service. Over time, auxiliary soldiers that
rose through the ranks within armies of the major factions were rewarded with citizenship
in addition to their standard pay. Evidence of these agreements can be found within the
Roman histories, such as with the case of Flavius Aetius, a Roman general whose father,
a Scythian by the name of Flavius Gaudentius, had acquired rank and stature through
service to the Eastern Roman Empire.12 Aetius later went on to make use of Hunnic
forces in campaigns both internal and external, as he rose in power, and it was likely that
these forces fought in non-Hunnic armies for their economic benefit.13
The Roman experience with auxiliaries differs from other classical factions and
empires, in that the auxiliaries of Rome represented a far greater diversity of subjects and
hired forces, due in part to the expanse of the empire at its greatest extent. “In support of
the legions, the auxilia provided substantial numbers of well-mounted, disciplined
cavalrymen – something often lacking under the Republic – as well as archers equipped
with sophisticated composite bows. There were also slingers and other skirmishers, but
11
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the majority of auxiliary infantrymen fought in a style very similar to the legionaries.”14
This diversifying of forces set a measure by which later political factions and
governments could look to in raising outside forces.
The auxiliaries of this period set forth an example for the mercenary tradition that
would develop during the medieval period in Europe, as well-disciplined and trained
fighting forces that could supplement the armies that they supported. By the end of the
third century C.E., the imperial army of Rome was more Germanic than Roman, as the
empire came to depend on the military expertise of foreigners and it became relatively
harder to recruit native Romans into the force.15 The Roman Empire later turned to
depend on outsiders and subjects in the frontier regions to support their armies, as during
the Pax Romana period’s use of foederati as paid outside forces. These federate forces
served under a foedus or pact by which the imperial government hired them, and “the
foedus … may well be considered a contract for service whether the agreement was made
by an individual foederatus or by a group of foederati serving under a leader of some
sort.”16
The period came to a close as Europe experienced the gradual societal collapse of
the Roman Empire as the population began to shift from the urban towns and cities of the
empire to the countryside. The degrading nature of the economic system of Rome saw
the power of great lords greatly increase as these populations became entrenched around
the rural estates, which in turn became fortified strongholds over time. Cases still existed
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of use during the period of lull in the cycle, such as with the British decision to hire the
German mercenaries, foederati, to defend Britain after the withdrawal of Roman legions
under Constantine III.17
This first lull in the cycle was brought about by a shift in economic practices and
governance, thus shifting the makeup of militaries in the greater European region to
localized centers of power as political control devolved into feudalism. The
decentralized nature of feudalism saw levy systems and layered obligations to military
service become the mechanism for military recruitment, which turned out to be
ineffective for conflicts of long duration, in which companies of hired warriors were later
conceived as a solution to the problem.18 The feudalist structure of societies and legalmilitary customs would continue into the early Medieval period, but would become
untenable as the process by which the greater military system functioned became
inefficient for raising the forces that city-states and early nation-states needed for the
increasing scope of conflict that came in the new millennium.

Medieval Period
The mercenary tradition came into fruition during the Medieval Era, as the
considerable number of city-states and early nation-states began the great competitions
that would shape Europe into the state-based system that prevailed in this period. As
kings, great lords, city-states, and the early nation-states began to increase their outward
17
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views of political power in early formations of foreign policy and relations, paid men
became the way to judge the quality of force, as levy forces were slowly replaced with a
mix of paid retainers and professional soldiers, both mercenary and resident.
Mercenaries reappeared in the Medieval period around the end of the ninth
century, as increased economic output and investment created an atmosphere in which
factions could expand their quarrels and conflicts further abroad, while offering pay for
military service to both citizens or levies as well as foreign opportunists. The appearance
of mercenaries in late tenth century, at least in England, has been attributed to the
emergence of the money economy, which resulted in the hiring of troops and direct
payments to both individuals and companies.19 The differences in language, political
terminology and typology, have meant that there was no one distinguishing reference to
mercenaries throughout much of Europe until late in the Middle Ages. Terminology
ranged from the generic references to regions or troubled lands from which paid men
originated to those terms that derived from old Latin references to coin or pejorative
terms.
The blunt term mercenary or mercenarii was to be avoided in this time period, in
part because of the ecclesiastical overtones, and while the use of paid men was
regarded as a sign of power, a ‘paid’ lord was considered to be degraded. The
issue of identity is also raised with regards to whether there is a pure mercenary,
as men who fought for money could also at times have been moved by ideological
considerations. Thus, there were very strong social and cultural reasons for a
framework of language which hides reality, and it was not until the late Middle
Ages and the advent of professional armies that the mercenary became a distinct
and identifiable figure.20
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While there existed no standard defining reference in this time period to distinguish who
was and was not a mercenary, there has since evolved a series of central qualities to those
who served in this capacity.
The principle characteristic of the mercenary became the idea of foreigners
fighting for pay, but this is a modern construct, as it was not until the later end of this
period that distinct national identities came to play a role in the fostering of a distinct
mercenary identity. Kelly Devries recounts the historian Michael Mallett’s definition that
“It is the concept of fighting for profit, together with the gradual emergence of a concept
of ‘foreignness,’ which distinguishes the true mercenary … from the ordinary paid
soldier.”21 This idea of foreignness and the distinct mercenary identity was shaped by the
transformations in conflict during the Medieval period, as armies swelled in size and
political and religious factions competed for both territory and influence.
With the disintegration of the former Carolingian Empire into internecine conflict
in the late ninth and early tenth century, the Hungarians became a mercenary society, as
the ethnic group made their marital services available to the leaders and kings of Eastern
and Central Europe. After settling into a semi-permanent settled state in the Caparthian
Basin near the Danube river, the Hungarians continued their profession as classic
nomadic mercenaries in their new homeland as they found willing customers for their
‘service industry.’22 The nomadic nature of the group meant that it made more sense for
them to fight for pay rather than raiding for plunder and slaves that many of their peers in
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this part of Europe partook in. For the Hungarians, these careers and the militant lifestyle
allowed for them to maintain the herds and horses needed to support their large numbers,
serving as both economic rationale and motivation to curtail other forms of
development.23 The Hungarians continued to be in demand until the consolidation of
power under Otto I in East Francia brought about an end to the infighting of the
Germanic Tribes in Central Europe, culminating in the Hungarian defeat in 955 at the
battle of Lechfield.
It was during the early twelfth century that the mercenary identity became
widespread, in part supported by the needs of rules such as Henry II of England (11541189). Under Henry II, it was not the numbers or ratio of mercenary to regular troops
that was important, but as to how and why he engaged in contracts with nonnative forces.
Henry made use of a number of different mercenaries, most notably the Welsh and
Brabanters, a group with a “vicious reputation, singled out during the Third Lateran
Council of 1179, which ordered the excommunication of any Christian hiring their
services.”24 The Brabanters set the example for the later Flemish and low countries
mercenaries of the later Medieval Period, as the continued state of conflict and vulnerable
position of the region of Brabant, around modern Antwerp, meant that militarism became
a way of life with a specialism that made them a useful auxiliary for armies of the
period.25 This specialization allowed for the group to carve out a niche that could be
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utilized while also advertising to potential employers a reasoning as to how the group
could be of service.
Looking back at Henry II, it was with regard to the reliability of vassals and a
ruler’s own forces that led many to view the utility of such hired forces. The ready
availability of mercenaries both in England and on the continent over time presented
rulers with valuable alternatives to untrustworthy or ineffective native forces. Such was
the case with Henry’s later campaigns, in which he transported Welshmen to the
Continent and Brabanters to England, as he desired on certain occasions the unique
attributes particular brands of mercenaries brought to a campaign.26 This idea was
emphasized in the more widespread use of Catholic military orders founded during the
Crusades, as these institutions became contract orders hired out by the Catholic Church in
pursuit of protecting the Holy Lands of the Levant as well as the remains of the
Byzantine Empire from the encroaching Islamic empires.
The Crusades represented the call to arms of all Christendom by the Catholic
Church for a series of wars, and military orders such as the Teutonic Order set a standard
for later semi-state militant actors in the international sphere. After turning to the Baltic
Crusades of the fourteenth century, the Prussian branch of the Teutonic Order sought to
carve out a territory for rule. The resulting conflicts led to a break from the religious
motivations for conflict, and instead for a mix of monetary and territorial gain without the
Papal blessing they had come to depend on for recruitment and warfare. The situation
became complicated for the Order when war broke out with Christian Poland, and the
institution could not count on the crusader armies, making it necessary for the Order to
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recruit mercenaries.27 The Teutonic Order’s recruitment needs emphasized the nature of
changing motivations for paid men during this period, as chivalry and religion would
represent a reason for service in one conflict, but in the next conflict monetary gain may
be the main motive for participation. At the end of the Order’s time in Prussia, it was an
ideological problem that forced the group to turn to the expensive mercenary recruitment
against Poland, leading to a constant dilemma until its dissolution in 1525.28 The lack of
outside support drove the Order to hire mercenaries, and in doing so only served to
distance itself further from the supposed causes they supported.
Around this same time, the Byzantine Empire was experimenting with a concept
of mercenary royal guards, loyal only to the emperor, and by extension the state. Known
as the Varangian Guards, these men were in relative isolation to the court intrigues and it
was said of them that “they pass on loyalty to the Emperors and the protection of their
bodies from one to another like ancestral inheritance, a trust or a sort of guardianship;
these stay unshakably loyal, and will not brook the slightest hint of disloyalty.”29 Drawn
from tribes in Northern Europe, the men of the Varangian Guards had diverse
backgrounds, with some even being from royal families, such as Harald Hardrada the
later king of Norway. As outsiders rather than stakeholders in the schemes of the court,
the Varangians were not beholden to the interests of factions and were free to perform
their task with single-minded efficiency and effectiveness.30 This outsourcing of
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protection set standards for later groups, such as with Papacy’s use of Swiss mercenaries
in the later stages of this period, and the continued recognition of these Swiss Guards
today by the Vatican.
As part of the Hundred Years’ War, mercenaries and free companies became
heavily used in both the primary conflict between France and England, but also as part of
neighboring conflicts such as the Spanish (Castilian) Civil War during the fourteenth
century. As a way of neutralizing the Castilian-English alliance, King Charles V of
France aligned with the Trastamara party who needed the support of the French
Companies of Bertrand du Guesclin, and arranged for the support of these companies by
the Pope.31 This action represents the existence of an understanding of the need for
private military forces in conflict during the period even as the Catholic Church had
previously set a precedent against use with the Third Lateran Council. The White
Companies, formed in France, were based on the model of the companies of condottiere
that were beginning to control the battlefields of Italy, and their formation and use
marked a new way of waging war that differed from the chivalry of former periods.32
This period saw the beginnings of the military revolution, as new technologies and
increasingly large armies meant that the brutality of conflict was no longer held to small
battlefields, but instead entire regions.
The fourteenth century brought about a renewed period of violence in Italy,
especially in the territories bordering the Alps, with the beginnings of a series of wars,
both local and regional, that lured many outside groups into the conflicts. The free
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companies and other mercenary groups were known collectively as the condottiere and
represented the mercenaries of the later medieval period. The condottiere got their start
in the Italian armies of the thirteenth century, especially in the Papal armies. In the wars
waged by the Popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV, the mercenaries employed by the
papacy were normally Italian, but later expanded to include troops from France, Austria,
Germany, Spain, and Portugal, representing a truly mixed force.33 The condottiere
challenge the concept of foreignness that has been applied in defining mercenaries over
time, as the Italian states considered themselves both separate and part of the greater Italy
during this period, meaning that Italian mercenaries consistently fought for groups
outside the provinces they came from.
The Italian states increasingly turned to outside forces as conflict on the peninsula
continued, with cities such as Florence, Venice, Milan, and Genoa in constant periods of
war.
The free companies evolved from temporary organizations to more permanent
military and economic organizations that over time became tied to agreements
signed with their employers that developed into highly detailed condottas that
specified the length and terms of service, number of men, and pay. These
condotta were documents of great care, drawn up by the equivalent of modern
lawyers.34
The condottiere developed into a form of privatized international actors who acted at
times in the interest of those they represented, but also with their profit remaining central
to their decision-making. Some of these actors were individuals such as John Hankwood,
one of the most well-known condottiere of the period, who as an English mercenary
attained great wealth and renown in fourteenth century Italy, and served as the basis for
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numerous other groups in Medieval Europe.35 Widespread use along these lines
continued through the Thirty Years War, when the devastation in Europe led the major
states to negotiate for a new peace that resulted in the Treaties of Westphalia, which
created the new state-based system of international relations, while weakening the
markets for force.
The end of the Thirty Years War signaled the beginnings of the lull in the cycle
from the Medieval period, in part due to the legalistic nature of the Treaties of
Westphalia, setting a benchmark for later legal norms as well as international law. The
gathering of nations to sign the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked the end of the
Medieval mercenary tradition, as nation-states began to monopolize the conduct of war.
This monopolization was a gradual process, beginning in the sixteenth century, and
spanned centuries, as states developed public armies maintained in peace and war, and
loyal only to the state.36 Some early states continued to engage in the mercenary trade,
but in a manner that differed from this previous tradition, as some smaller states began to
loan out companies of soldiers to competing states during the intervening period.
This lull was bookmarked in part by the increases in conflict less than a century
after the Thirty Years War, as colonial competition between many European powers,
primarily the English, French, and Spanish, outside of Europe led to the need for
recruitment of forces beyond that of the capability of the state to support. It was in this
expansion of global conflicts that the concept of the private contractor merged with the
mercenary identity.
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Late Modern Period
The late modern period saw a shift in the use of mercenary forces and the
mercenary tradition towards contractors that served states, many times as citizens
working for private interests that were guaranteed by the state. The beginnings of this
period blur with the dying gasps of the Medieval period, as some early joint-stock and
trading companies were established for the purpose of exploration and settlement in
regions such as North American and South Asia. Contractors became prevalent in the
New World, as the formation of joint stock ventures and trading companies led to
increased settlement and expansion without direct state investment in the enterprises. For
many of these ventures, profit, rather than national pride, became the primary motivation
for engaging in conflict outside the Continent. The key to understanding this period’s
version of mercenary use is in the form of contract conflict, which had been
institutionalized under the Italian condottieri, and had been translated into versions of
contracts passed down to charter and trading companies, granting military and use of
force rights to private actors.
During the early modern period, many nation-states began to utilize private
contractors for a range of activities from exploration and colonization to national defense.
Early British attempts to colonize the Americas came in the form of charters issued to
contractors and companies willing to take risks in establishing settlements in the name of
the British Crown. Settlements such as Jamestown and Plymouth were built and funded
by investors separate from the British Crown, who sought the opportunity to benefit from
possible profits from the New World. In 1607 Captain John Smith landed in the
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Chesapeake Bay, having been sent by the joint-stock business Virginia Company of
London. He was tasked with overseeing security operations in the New World, as the
company hoped to mine for gold and explore the surrounding countryside for more
lucrative natural resources in hopes of establishing a more permanent English
settlement.37 It was not only states that were contracting out security, but the companies
were beginning to turn to the idea of subcontractors to fill their needs.
It is during this period that the American experience with mercenaries began,
starting with the American Revolution. When the American colonies revolted against the
British Crown, the British did not have the necessary manpower to fight a war in the
Americas while also being engaged in conflicts in other theatres. “It’s allies, such as
Russia, refused to loan troops to put down what they saw as an internal peasant revolt.
So, Britain turned to the international market, primarily German principalities, such as
Hesse-Kassel and in all 29,875 German troops crossed the Atlantic.”38 As the British
attempted to hold onto their status as a Great Power during the period, the international
markets for force were seen as a necessity to uphold the status quo without risking great
losses across multiple theaters of engagement.
The devastation of the Thirty Years’ War on the German principalities, and
especially Hesse-Kassel, meant that the state had a high population density with little in
the form of economic support, leading them to consider the markets of force that
remained in continued existence on the European continent. What rendered Hesse-Kassel
unique among the German states is that it looked to its military establishment as the
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principle source of income for economic recovery, as the military had represented an
international recruiting ground as well as contemporary German view of warfare as an
integral part of the natural order.39 In the military establishment being the principle
source of income for the state, this presents the idea of state-sponsored mercenarism, in
that the state oversaw the contract between the soldiers and the outside requesting party.
State-sponsored mercenarism differs slightly from the individual mercenary in that the
state received a portion of the profits from military engagement in conflicts, compared to
the direct contract. This process of state engagement in the markets for force, while
legitimate at the time, began to earn a morally repugnant status, attaching labels such as
Menschenhandel (trade in human beings) and Menschenverkauf (sale of human beings).40
Even though state-sponsored mercenarism earned these labels, the process presented a
concept that set precedents for later practices.
This period also witnessed the birth of the contractor companies, with the creation
of trading companies that were self-sustaining, such as the British East India Company.
Created to protect early British interests in the Indian subcontinent, this company later
became the dominant force in ruling the territories for the British Empire. This was part
of the delegation of military affairs to quasi-state-run trading companies such as the
British East India Company, which commanded its own armed forces and governed India
for Great Britain for more than two centuries.41 While the state still had a say in the
overall behavior of the companies, these companies represented their own ideas of
foreign policy to be directed in the interests of the stakeholders.
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For the British East India Company, the involvement in military affairs started
early on, as the company attempted to carve out a political position within the Indian
subcontinent, and prior to the consolidation of lands after the Battle of Plassey in 1757.
After attacks on Mughal shipping from India at the beginning of the eighteenth
century, the Emperor Aurangzeb insisted that the only remedy to the situation
would be for the British East India Company, with the Dutch and the French, to
provide convoys to protect Mughal Indian Ocean shipping against all pirates.
Samuel Annesley, the Company’s president, had earlier proposed an alternative
that the Company should also seek from Aurangzeb a position as a Mughal
military and police force over the high seas, a faujdari or sheriff for the
“Saltwater.” Annesley predicted that this would bring the Company special
immunities, privileges, and a jagir, or assignment of revenue, worth over 400,000
rupees per annum.42
Samuel Annesley’s views of this quasi-militant status for the Company represented the
growing concept of companies providing security and military services for both their
government as well as outside states within regions of contention or conflict. Annesley’s
proactive gambling allowed for the Company to stake a political claim for company rule
in India.
The British East India Company became one of the largest multinational
companies during this time and saw this prosperity turn into both economic and political
power as the company controlled the Indian subcontinent for much of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. The Company was increasingly in a dilemma as their rule
continued, and as economist J.R. McCulloch remarked that “A Company which carries a
sword in one hand, and a ledger in the other – which maintains armies and retails tea, is a
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contradiction”.43 In this idea, the state and the Company were partners in India, and
resources gained from the continent only indirectly benefited the empire, as Company
revenue came first, legitimizing the use of private force for protection of state interests.
For much of India, the Company represented British rule until it was dissolved after the
Sepoy Rebellion in 1857. It was composed of both the civil and military governing
authorities under a board of directors, granted a charter that was renewed by the British
Crown, whose choices were in the Company’s interests before those of the government.
In this context Company rule could be made acceptable on a long-term basis if the
Company was perceived as a lawful ruler rather than a commercial enterprise.
This problem was solved by making use of the traditional structure of feudal
governance and loyalty, in which local rulers occupied central places in this
structure and regarded as legitimate sovereign.44
This portrayal of lawful ruler in India allowed for the British and the Company to justify
the use of private force as the Company was an indirect representative of the British
Crown during this time.
As the British developed this system of corporate governance, others were also
experimenting with similar formats of indirect rule that utilized private force as a means
of expanding regional influence. European states ceded political power in regions
outside the Continent to these companies as a means of future investment, while at the
same time acknowledging a sense of sovereignty to early corporate interests. In the case
of the British East India Company, these officials engaged in diplomatic relations in Asia,
keeping residents at various courts while also seeking and accumulating agreements,
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treaties, and farmans (imperial commands providing immunities and privileges) from
both local and imperial powers throughout Asia.45 It was in these relations that the
Company officials proposed protection for the native rulers from other outside companies
and states seeking to gain footholds in the region.46
This period marks a shift in the evolution of mercenary use within the cycle, as
companies became extensions of state policy, and increasingly beholden to the directives
of the national government, unlike their predecessors of earlier periods. The later private
military companies that became prominent starting in the Cold War were the result of this
evolution, wherein states utilized private force under a general command structure to
support public forces in conflict zones. This release came after the international
community saw the state take control over military power and closed the markets for
force for close to a century, as warfighting became part of the public sector.
While the idea of a state monopoly on force had been set by the Treaty of
Westphalia, it was not until the advent of the ideals of nationalism at the end of this
period that military power was administered solely by the state. This came as a result of
the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, which marked the next downswing in the cycle of
mercenary use.
“Napoleonic reforms also helped consolidate the states’ monopoly of force. As
the Napoleonic Wars continued, the model of national conscription eventually
became the norm for all powers, and it survives today. Administrative changes
also helped put private armies out of business. Sustaining a large standing army is
complicated and expensive, requiring a considerable bureaucracy to collect taxes
and administer revenue. Over time, large centralized state bureaucracies replaced
feudal lordships in the machinations of governance and especially military
administration.”47
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The centralized state bureaucracies that came from these reforms allowed for a
supporting structure for national military service and trained standing armies that did not
need a complementary private force during times of conflict. This shifting market for
force that had been dominated by mercenaries and companies to the monopolization by
states was gradual, as states consolidated their power and centered the control of conflict
under national militaries.48 The public-private partnerships of the late modern period,
like the British East India Company, marked the close of this monopolization, as control
over private conflict was centered in large chartered companies that slowly ceded their
power to the state.

Contemporary Period
After the devastation of two world wars, states began to reconsider ceding power
to private actors as a means of limiting the effects of war on populations that were
separate from conflicts that they may be engaged in. As conflict spread across the
African continent, newly independent states and rebel groups look to outside sources of
personnel to provide military force in their attempts to control both internal conflicts and
external threats. To respond to this demand, private military companies (PMCs) and
individual mercenaries began to flock to the continent to provide defense services.
Outside of announced corporate mergers, tracking the activities of these companies has
become increasingly difficult with time, as they are shrouded in secrecy and government
contracts are regularly classified and away from the public eye.
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Executive Outcomes (EO) was one of the most prominent of these companies,
participating in a number of conflict zones in Africa in the 1990s. The company was
registered in Great Britain as far back as 1993, in part because “London is an
international centre of informal defense and security activity, arms dealing and war
profiteering.”49 While being registered in Great Britain, the company primarily operated
in Africa in support of struggling governments fighting internal conflicts. “[During this
time, EO utilized the South African Defense Forces] – along with the police, and the
remains of Koevoot (or crowbar), a former counter-insurgency force in Namibia - as a
skilled labor pool. The SADF regards the loss of trained personnel, pilots especially, as
crude poaching.”50 The company’s first testing ground was the civil war in Angola, as
many of the men had participated in one form or another prior to the end of the Cold
War. After UNITA forces captured the Soyo oilfields in the country, EO was contracted
to take the oilfields back, and after successful completion of this mission was contracted
to provide training missions to the Angolan army.51 After the company’s time in Angola,
it was contracted to provide security forces for the struggling government in Sierra Leone
to hold off the advancing rebel forces. The actions of EO in Sierra Leone and Angola
also opened the world to a new option for private force in the form of stability operations
and humanitarian peacekeeping.
The conflict in Sierra Leone saw an international intervention in 1998, responding
to the collapse of government functions after the forced exit of Executive Outcomes and
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other groups supporting the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. As part of
the international intervention in the conflict raging in the country, Nigerian troops under
the West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, and a handful of other groups
supported the under-equipped national army.
The small U.S. contribution was not part of a seconded military unit, but a private,
Oregon-based company, International Charter Incorporated of Oregon (ICI), one
of several companies contracted by the U.S. State Department to go into danger
zones deemed too risky or unsavory to commit conventional U.S. forces. While
the services the company provided were of a support role, the personnel were
forced to engage in defensive combat, a right extended to the company in a letter
from the U.S. ambassador to Sierra Leone, Joseph Melrose. Employees that
discussed the conflict with the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists explained that the hot combat was left to the South African
mercenaries.52
This deployment of contractors represented part of the global trend of military
outsourcing and foreign policy by proxy that began to play an increasing role in
international politics after the Cold War. The “peace dividend” that came as a result of
the end of the Cold War saw the absence of a clear direct threat to the United States and
the Western powers, which led to substantially reduced defense budgets and smaller
armed forces that created a collision of supply and demand in military and security
services in the world market.53 The reduction in defense budgets meant that countries
now needed options for security services outside of the state controlled military, and this
allowed for an influx of companies to take advantage with an increasing supply of
personnel that they could provide.
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A number of companies began to expand operations in late 1990s as countries
began to look outward for advanced military and police training. London-based TASK
International, which cites its niche market as the training of military and police forces,
has trained the Jamaican police and in the past has trained the presidential guard in
Nigeria, the royal police in Malaysia and the special forces of the United Arab
Emirates.54 This same ICIJ investigation revealed that miniature versions of the wellknown PMCs, such as EO and Blackwater, began to offer these downscaled versions of
military training and tactical response packages.
The Nevada-based Sayeret Group says it has tactical teams that can deploy to
anywhere in the world in support of security, protection and direct-action
operations. Pistris Inc., a Massachusetts-based maritime security company which
maintains its own fleet of vessels, also claims it can provide fully equipped,
mobile protection teams to provide waterborne security of oil fields, ports and
vessels throughout the world.55
As regional hotspots became increasingly active at the beginning of the twenty-first
century, these companies were well-situated to provide defensive combat and noncombat services to their clients as they had this global reach.
The advancement of the cycle in this period was stunted by the creation of an
international legal regime against mercenary use but has not entirely broken the cycle.
Instead the use of private force in the grey areas of the law has continued and pushed the
boundaries of the legal ability of the international community to impose effective control
over conflict. The general attitude towards the private use of force in the early 1990s
might have suggested that it was becoming increasingly accepted and efforts to control it
had failed and suggested that the prospects for future use of private force were good.56
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However, even as there was an increase in the use of private force, the private groups
involved in conflict were in increasingly grey areas around the periphery of the legal
regime. Duke Piper, the Sayeret Group’s president, remarked in relation to the licensing
system for groups that work with the U.S. government, “There are no regulations or laws
saying you have to do X, Y, Z. It’s more of an integrity or ethical issue that comes into
play” adding that “some people do choose to operate behind the scenes or under the
table.”57 Piper thus illustrates that for much of the private military community, there is a
need to balance ethics rather than law in the private use of force, as profits are determined
by the public outlook rather than the ability of the international community to impose
controls.
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INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND LAW RELATING TO USE

As states centralized power over time, views on the use of mercenaries began to
change, seen both in the formation of international norms as well as the later international
laws of war. Much as the international legal system has changed over time in regards to
the conduct of war, the norms relating to conflict have been influenced by countless
cultural factors that shaped the concept of the mercenary into what is seen now. For the
purpose of this argument the focus is on the norms that relate to the use of private force in
a legalistic manner, addressing how the conduct of war was shaped in part by this use.
While the use of private force encompasses many aspects outside of mercenary use, it
was through the mercenary tradition and the development of these norms relating to their
use that the private military industry developed.

Norms Relating to Use
As mercenary use has progressed through time, the idea of the contractual nature
of international relations has played a part in shaping how actors engaged with these
forces. During the Medieval period, state began drafting legal contracts with mercenary
groups as well as individual contracts for service. By the sixteenth century, the
relationship between the state and mercenary had taken on this contractual nature, given
the name condotta in Italy, and became the subject of countless treaties in other areas.
Under the Perpetual Peace Treaty of 1516, specific rules were set about the
number of troops the French king could recruit; where and under which
circumstances Swiss troops could be use; and when the Swiss could recall their
troops, which was only in times of war. By the 1540s, the system was tightly
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organized, down to a tribunal with two judges from each country to arbitrate pay
disputes.58
While this relationship could be regarded as an alliance, the outlining of specific rules for
French foreign recruitment displayed a nature of relationship which followed this larger
pattern of the contractual nature of relations. It was not the treaty itself that established
the alliance, but rather provided the basis for numerous subsequent alliances, as the treaty
created an early form of arbitration for relations between the Swiss cantons and France.59
This idea of arbitrary clauses within state-to-state relations as part of larger treaties for
state-to-state relations supports the idea of state-sponsored mercenarism that was seen in
Hesse-Kassel and other German principalities in the eighteenth century. Relationships
such as these illustrate the importance of the existence of grey areas that continue to exist
in the classification of mercenary forces over time, as well as the status of modern private
and semi-public forces utilized by many countries in conflict zones.
This concept of the contractual nature of relations has implications for
international law, as agreements between states have formed the basis for later law. What
became customary international law has a general origination in the contractual nature of
agreements between states, whether these are bilateral or multilateral agreements.
Building on the customary agreements among states on the use and conduct of private
force, and with the devastation brought about by the global nature of World War I, the
international community agreed to a comprehensive framework on the laws of war under
the Geneva Conventions, in order to protect civilian populations in areas of conflict.
Under this framework, states saw no place for mercenaries or forces outside state control,
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and therefore tried to dictate the conditions in which actors could partake in conflict when
not under the control of a state. This norm helps to show how the conventions against
use are a split from the historical cycle of use, but at the same time an extension of the
recognized nature of contracts between states and non-state actors.
From the strategic perspective, the idea of cultural norms also plays a role in the
use of mercenaries over time. A society’s view of the use of force is an important factor
in determining whether they are amenable to the idea of private groups holding military
power. This can be tied to the degree of interdependence within a society, and if it is
more of a collectivist or individualist society, helping to determine where perceptions of
loyalty are derived.60 As European societies accepted the idea of working as or with
mercenaries, and the idea of utilizing private force that men began to travel and fight for
causes beyond their villages and homes. It was through the recruitment of men to serve
as mercenaries or paid men that military service as a career became widespread, fitting
into the broader society as a result of the economic and political changes that began to
take place during the early Medieval Period.61 Prior to the payment structures that arose
out of that period, it had become culturally acceptable for different political factions and
early states to allow foreigners to serve in their militaries as auxiliaries, making use of
training or combat experience not available to certain groups.
The expansion of private armies leading up to the Thirty Years War normalized
the idea of the professional soldier, while allowing for the growth of this idea as a
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cultural norm within many societies. This expansion allowed for societies to accept the
concept of professional soldiers as being culturally appropriate, as younger generations
followed in the footsteps of their fathers.62 This norm continued into the late modern
period, as a large percentage of officers serving the British East India Company in India
were from military families, and “the growing tendency of sons to follow their fathers
into Company service perpetuated this dynasty of middling sorts.”63
The norm that is most closely tied to the debate over the public versus private use
of force and by extension, mercenary use, is the Just War tradition. The theory of the Just
War originated with the works of St. Augustine, wherein the ecclesiastical bodies agreed
that while Christians could not kill in a private capacity, it was accepted in a public
manner when war was a response to avenge injury or to restore peace. The goal of the
Just War theory was to set the Church’s position in regards to warfare among actors and
set the general principles for which international law regarding the use of force would be
later based upon.
St. Thomas Aquinas later expanded on this concept with the idea that war needed
a sense of a controlling factor beyond the accepted nature of aggressive conflict between
man or the state. Aquinas focused in part on the idea of “whether war was licit (utrum
aliquod bellum sit licitum), [with] licitum then being the standard term used by
theologians and canon lawyers in evaluating actions whose normative status was in some
measure open to doubt.”64 With this understanding of licit, Aquinas and later theorists
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saw the use of force to be within the normal realm of behavior when conducted by a
legitimate authority, such as the state or the Church, but not individuals.
As this tradition developed, the ideas of the just cause and legitimate authority
became central to the arguments for acceptance of private force within the larger markets
for force in conflict. Wars of public motive became accepted as a just cause over the
unjust private motives of individuals. Mercenaries fighting for themselves did not have
‘just cause’ because they were not fighting for, and under the direction of, the noble
classes or the Church; their actions seen as criminal, and in some cases treasonable or
even heretical.65 This historical concept was codified into law over time, representing a
norm in both relations and actions among actors in international relations. While idea of
the just war continues to be regarded as one of the general principles upon which
international use of force law is based, the difficulty with distinctions to control conflict
based on justness is that such justifications are infinitely elastic and malleable.66 The
elastic nature of justification is present within the mercenary debate, dating back to the
medieval period, and evidence suggests that it was not necessarily financial motivation or
foreign status which distinguishes mercenaries from other fighters, but the presence or
absence of some kind of appropriately sanctioned cause.67
The post-medieval shift away from privatized conflict to the public use of force
under the control of the state is representative of how this norm was ingrained in the
minds of the decisionmakers within society. It was increasingly seen as necessary to use
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one’s own people as soldiers to justify the control of legitimate authority and the
following of an acceptable cause for war.
The distinction between a war fought under just authority and a war fought
outside it had significant practical ramifications. A routier captain on trial in 1391
pointed out that he had ‘done all those things which a man can and ought to do in
a just war, [such] as taking Frenchmen and putting them to ransom, living on the
country and despoiling it, and leafing the company under his command about the
realm of France, and burning and firing places in it’. The captain was executed
not for committing the acts, but because he did not have just authority to commit
them.68
This case presents an early legal situation wherein a mercenary was tried under the Just
Cause legal tradition, and also shows that at that time the concern over mercenaries
focused on control and the cause they fought for, and not necessarily the monetary aspect
of the private markets for force.
Towards the end of the Medieval Period the brutality of the wars in Italy led to the
humanist school of thought drawing the connection between morality and the fight for the
just cause in conflict. Italian humanists were concerned that using mercenaries would
undermine the civic spirit, and that the use of mercenaries by the Italian city-states was
not just immoral because mercenaries were not fighting for the cause of their employers,
but because their existence prevented citizens from having to support the cause of the
state.69 The humanist argument against use reached its apotheosis in the works of
Machiavelli, who, living in Italy during the height of the condottieri, saw a system of
warfare that allowed for individuals to control and dictate the terms of conflict, rather
than the Italian city-states. Machiavelli argued that mercenaries did not fight for the
common good as the republic is the common good; and that ‘a republic with its own
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armies holds out longer against the tyranny of one of its citizens than does a republic with
foreign armies.’70 His theory was that mercenaries were not part of a just cause and
therefore not part of the common good that the republic must seek when considering
military action.

International Law
As the international legal regimes surrounding the use of force expanded, the
classification of privileged versus unprivileged combatants became more defined,
delineating an internationally agreed upon definition of what made an unprivileged
combatant. Within these regimes, the legal discussion regarding mercenaries covers a
very small but increasingly important framework outlining the relationship between state
and non-state actors.
Use of force law represents the focus of the international legal discussions on
conflict, and by extension this covers the concerns and matters relating to mercenary use.
The legal framework is derived from the general sources that the International Court of
Justice and the United Nations look to when making decisions regarding action in the
international system. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
outlines the sources of international law, which the Court utilizes to decide disputes
amongst states.
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
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d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.71
Of interesting note in regards to the international legal framework that exists under this
structure is that legal precedent, or judicial decisions, is a subsidiary means of legal
argument. This means that even in the face of recognized cases of mercenarism, the legal
requirements must be generally recognized in a consensus of states, by which the rules
recognized apply to all parties involved. It is for this reason that the historical legal basis
proves to be of further importance in grasping the significance of custom and practice in
both defining mercenarism and arguing its existence in an international conflict.
The historical legal basis on which the current framework is constructed dates
back to the Third Lateran Council of 1179. The council singled out the Brabanters, a
group with a vicious reputation, and ordered the excommunication of any Christian hiring
their services.72 This action set a precedent against use, and while international law is not
based on precedent but custom, this decision by the religious leaders signaled the legal
customary practice that Christian men were expected to abide by. It is also of note that
the Lateran Council condemned only those mercenaries fighting for themselves, and out
of control, leaving mercenaries fighting under just title unaffected; again, going back to
the idea of the just cause.73 The Church represented the principal standard of control,
albeit flawed attempts for control during this period.
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In the fourteenth century, the Church again attempted to regain control over their
mercenary ‘problem’. In the papal bull Cogit nosi of February 27 1364, Pope Urban V
exemplified the moral disdain that the Church had for mercenaries, even as the political
factions in Europe depended upon them for war. Urban’s bulls excommunicated
mercenaries, granted indulgences to those who fought against them, forbade assisting
mercenaries, and tried to restrict the payment of protection money to get the mercenaries
to leave various areas.74 The Church and rulers sought to control private force through
different strategies, but it was not till much later that a consensus among actors could be
achieved. From this point until the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, the legal basis
dictating use revolved around contract law and treaties among individual states on the
accepted use and parameters of arrangements.
The Treaty of Westphalia set the stage for much of later international law as it
established the nation-state as the primary actor within international relations. The treaty
represented a convention among the European states that drew up the standards for
relations amongst states and sought to bring about a new world system that recognized
the state as the primary representative of ideas on the international stage. “In [this]
system of sovereign states, each recognizes the others as the final authorities within their
given territories, and only they can be considered actors within the system. It is precisely
on this ground that scholars have identified Westphalia with the origins of sovereignty: as
a formal statement of the principle of sovereignty.”75 This state-based system left little
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room for non-state actors such as mercenaries to actively participate in conflict, as states
sought to control the markets for force, and thus conflict itself.
At the end of World War I, the international community came together to develop
the next stage of the international legal framework on use of force law. The development
of the Geneva Conventions and overhaul of the Hague Conventions created a
combatant’s standard to recognize legal combatants on the battlefield. The combatant’s
standard has four requirements for a person to be classified as a prisoner of war if
captured; (a)they must have a visibly displayed unit insignia, (b) they must have a
recognized chain of command, (c) they must display their arms openly, and (d) must
conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.76
With the proliferation of non-state actors in the period of decolonization, and a
visibly changing nature of international conflict, the international legal community in
conjunction with the United Nations developed the Protocol Additionals to the Geneva
Convention to address these changes. It was in the concept of opinion juris, or the belief
that a norm is accepted as law, that Article 47 of the Geneva Conventions Protocol I
Additional is regarded as having reached the status of customary international law.77 The
normative behavior of states’ disregard for a private market for force meant that the
unspoken norm against mercenary use and the shift away from use at the end of the
Hundred Years War allowed for parties to claim the existence of a status of customary
international law to base these conventions on.
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The international law on mercenaries takes the form of two primary sources,
Article 47 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and the United Nations
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of
Mercenaries.78 It was in Article 47 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions
that the international community came to a consensus on a single definition of
mercenarism, but as a result of the need for an overwhelming majority of states to
recognize the protocol the definition has an expanded nature that allows for grey areas in
combatant classification. Article 47 states:
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.
2. A mercenary is any person who:
a. is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed
conflict;
b. does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
c. is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces of that Party;
d. is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a Party to the conflict;
e. is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
f. has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on
official duty as a member of its armed forces.79
The UN Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of
Mercenaries sought to provide a framework for prosecuting states that engaged in the
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markets for private force and utilized mercenaries in international conflict, as well as
acknowledging the growing capability of non-state actors to become involved in these
markets.80 The convention specifically expands upon the recruitment of private forces
for the purpose of overthrowing a government or undermining territorial integrity. This
augmenting of the legal definition is a result of the presence of mercenary and other
private forces in the battlefields of Africa at the end of the twentieth century, where proxy
forces and liberation movements mixed with private force within internal conflicts.
The presence of extraneous requirements for one to be considered a mercenary
under the UN definition was the result of loopholes created in the negotiating process in
order to gain a consensus amongst the international community. These definitional
loopholes were not meant to allow for mercenaries to act in international conflict, but
instead a means of protecting public forces that crossed into grey areas and private
contracting forces that served under distinct chains of command. Inconsistencies and
loopholes within the law were side effects of state attempts to deal with particularly
thorny issues rather than purposeful attempts to create that might be easily
circumvented.81 One of the most heavily criticized aspects of Article 47 of the Protocol
was Paragraph (2)(e), which specifically excludes those persons who are members of
armed forces of parties to a conflict, as a number of states still retain non-resident and
non-citizen soldiers within the formal structure of the military, such as the French
Foreign Legion and British Commonwealth forces.82 These actors were not perceived by
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the states to be mercenaries, instead being soldiers permanently enrolled in the armed
forces of a state, and therefore the states sought to protect traditional practices and units
that were not generally considered mercenary.
This legal definition of the mercenary drafted under the Geneva Conventions also
represents a form of regulatory attempt on the increasing proliferation of private and nonstate actors in international conflict, by outlining the limits of what was accepted in the
use of private force in conflict zones. Much of the regulatory efforts and oversight that
now exist are domestic and mostly limited to those governments that have utilized groups
such as PMCs. Many other governments have acknowledged the need for the services
that PMCs offer, but have yet to develop a structure to oversee them.83 Specifically
looking at the U.S. model for oversight reveals that it is far from comprehensive.
Defensive services, including training, are considered military products under
U.S. law, particularly the International Traffic in Arms Regulations Law (ITAR),
requiring PMCs to obtain approval from the State Department before selling their
services to a foreign government. However, these companies can also sell their
services abroad through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
program, which does not require any licensing by State.84
While these regulatory efforts help to keep governments informed of where their citizens
are operating abroad, the general public has little information to the extended reach of
these companies. According to Douglas Johnson, the State Department’s Office of
Defense Trade Controls spokesman, State lawyers determined that the only information
which should be available to the public about contracts between a private U.S. military
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company and a foreign government is which country the contract was performed in and
what services were exported – and then only through the Freedom of Information Act.85
This proves to be a problem when the companies themselves attempt to provide
the public with information as to how the operate on certain contracts. For instance,
when Erik Prince testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, he was prohibited under the State Department
Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS II) contract’s gag clause to speak about
the contract itself to the congressional committee.86 For these companies, and the states
they work with to create an effective legal regime on the private use of force requires
input from the outside, which has not been achieved to this point.
The Treaty of Westphalia created a basis for the state monopoly on the use of
force, which was later enshrined in use of force law, but this basis has been challenged
recently with the rise in asymmetric conflicts where multiple states are involved either
directly or with the use of proxy forces for a range of reasons. In their attempts to outlaw
mercenaries, what the international community did instead was provide a form of
regulatory law regarding the private use of force, and this has allowed for the cycle’s
continued presence as private actors are present in conflict zones.
If, as the humanists of the eighteenth century saw it, the defining factor that
separated mercenaries was the concept of the Just Cause, then the legal frameworks have
presented a conundrum. As much of the legal regime in regards to combatants’ privileges
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focus on the standards by which soldiers must abide and what protections they can be
afforded, at the same time this regime is based in humanitarian law as a means of
protecting life. The law regarding mercenaries and the use of private force as it currently
stands is a misinterpretation of the identity, based in a reductionist theory that has come
out of the international disdain for those who provide private force in conflict.
Machiavelli’s arguments against mercenary use had a direct impact on subsequent
anti-mercenary thought, and this also impacted the later design of international law
regarding their use.87 An acceptance of the distortion of facts surrounding this use during
the intervening period meant that later generations led with this idea of diminished
strength of the state when arguing for the outlawing of a structure of military service in
direct competition with the state-based system of relations. Modern legal and security
experts have thus been presented with a difficult situation in which there is an
increasingly complex grey area where forces operate near this former framework in
regards to the use of force.
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THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

The increasingly defined legal standing on the private investment in the markets
for force have meant that mercenarism has experienced a shift from the clear-defined
nature of the past. As illustrated by the expanded nature of private actors in international
conflict, the varying shades of grey have allowed for continued investment in conflict by
private actors. The legal frameworks that have come out of the presence of an
international consensus on the need to control mercenary use have affected the cycle in a
negative sense, as this framework stunted the resurgence of the cycle as conflict shifted to
a less state-centric nature in the wake of World War II.

Realist Argument for Use
The Westphalian system brought the markets for force under state control, as the
states began to monopolize their ability to conduct war, and this continued through much
of the twentieth century. It was the rapid decolonization of former territories and
proliferation of nonstate actors after the Cold War that created an atmosphere in which
private force became a viable option for control of conflicts again. Within this state of
international security, realist theory helps to explain why states look to private actors to
address security concerns.
The development of the laws of war and later recognition of a need to define who
was a mercenary comes from an idealist perspective, in which the international
community sought to outline what was acceptable behavior in war. The inherent problem
is that war is the breakdown of relations, when all other options are exhausted in the
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discourse among actors, much as Clausewitz argued in the treatise On War, that war is
nothing but the continuation of policy by other means.88 But as the world has seen, the
rules and settled patterns of behavior can only be shaped to a certain point, before human
nature takes over. The outlawing of mercenary use in the Geneva Conventions only
holds so long as state abide by the agreed conditions and defining qualities. This has
begun to change recently as the private military industry was thrust into the fold in the
Balkans, and later as part of the War on Terror conducted by the United States, as states
have looked to the grey areas of the legal regime in which some of these actors operate.
These attempts to force a change in the anarchical system seen under realism
came as a result of a shift in the portrayal of mercenary groups prior to the
institutionalization of a legal definition of what constituted mercenary action. Part of the
reason mercenaries were considered especially heinous during the decolonization period
was that their use negatively affected the changing nature of statehood, as new states
sought to strengthen norms and institutions promoting self-determination.89 The
character of society also plays a role in this change, and in the view of the military
historian Paul Schmitthenner “democratic forms and traditions have as a rule given rise to
militias, while absolutism has invariably supported itself by mercenary troops.”90 While
this still mostly holds true, at the same time democratic societies such as the United
States have looked to private actors for assistance in balancing security risks after defense
cuts following the Cold War. By allowing contractors to handle security details and
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training, as well as other support functions from maintenance to cooking, militaries could
focus on combat operations.
The gathering of nations to sign the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked the end
of the Medieval mercenary tradition, as nation-states began to monopolize the conduct of
war. This monopolization was a gradual process, beginning in the sixteenth century, and
spanned centuries, as states developed public armies maintained in peace and war, and
loyal only to the state.91 This means that the state’s monopoly over violence was the
exception rather than the norm for most of history, until legal principles were established
beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia.
The legal frameworks discussed in the previous section established a baseline
definition of mercenarism, one which is maximalist in its application to the fluidity of
conflict in the rapidly changing world of contemporary international politics. In
international legal theory, under the understanding of maximalism, that which is not
explicitly prohibited in law is permitted; thus, there still exists room for private groups to
operate in areas of conflict. However, the very definitions that international law uses to
identify mercenaries includes a series of vague, restrictive requirements, such that it is
nearly impossible to find anyone in any place who fulfills all the criteria.92 These laws
were not meant to prohibit the trade in military services, but instead served as a form of
legal regulation on the privatized side of the industry. Many of the countries that pushed
the formation of this legal regime were from Africa and had experienced the importation
of military forces in conflict.
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The argument for the success of the legal regime falls apart though when one
encounters Angola’s history of conflict. Angola was one of the first signatories of the
UN Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries,
and by 1994 had already used a PMC, Executive Outcomes (EO) against the UNITA
insurgency in the country.93 The use of private contractors to take back they Soyo
oilfields and train and support the military helped the government force the insurgents
back to the negotiating table. The Angola case is an interesting one in that while it
illustrates the presence of realist actions, it also presents an idealist view that private
force can be used to lower the political and economic costs of a conflict for a state. This
also plays into the next, and one of the most important, tenets of realist theory.
The use of private force and mercenaries in conflict comes down to the idea of
competitive self-interest, where individuals will act in their best interests and not that of
the larger group. In a world that has increasingly accepted the failings of the United
Nations in the modern period, and where states are seeing a breakdown of the previous
order with a rise in internal conflicts as well as interest in humanitarian intervention, they
are turning to outside groups to provide supporting military services in times of need.
For instance, the failings of the United Nations to halt the coming collapse in Sierra
Leone, with the rebels supported by the Liberian government under Charles Taylor,
meant that the government in Serra Leone had to turn to another actor for support.
The role of Executive Outcomes as an autonomous operator is less important than
its symptomatic character. Any appraisal of its business has to be weighed against
the doings, and non-doings, of the governments, international organizations and
capital formations that have contributed to the opening into which it has moved
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with such alacrity. If there were strong, consensual political and social institutions
in Angola or Sierra Leone, EO would have no place in either.94
In recent years it has become increasingly difficult for states to build coalitions to address
both conflicts and possible regional security concerns, and much as the governments of
Angola and Sierra Leone turned to Executive Outcomes, other states have turned to
private actors to provide options that will fill their self-interests. This means that in some
cases the states offer concessions to the private actors in the form of natural resource
opportunities. The presence of clear financial incentives and opportunities, and alleged
links to companies in position to take advantage of natural resource opportunities has not
helped PMCs avoid the mercenary label, even when they operate in the interests of the
states they serve.95
The state of use of private force today differs significantly from previous periods,
as the private military industry has taken on a distinctly corporate character. “[Today’s
military companies] have a distinct corporate character, have openly defended their
usefulness and professionalism, have used internationally accepted legal and financial
instruments to secure their deals, and so far have supported only recognized governments
and avoided regimes unpalatable to the international community.”96 At the same time
states have been willing to accept the private use of force in order to preserve their public
personality. When faced with a mounting death toll in Iraq in the mid-2000s, the United
States sought to utilize private contractors for expanded security roles in the country in
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part to alleviate the strain that the media placed on the recorded deaths of American
soldiers in the country.
While the general realist theory is based in the concept of states as the primary
actors, the changing nature of world politics requires this understanding in order to grasp
the full effect that these private actors play in supporting roles. The theory is based in the
idea that these primary actors act in a unitary way in pursuit of their national interest and
must rely primarily on themselves to manage their own insecurity.97 With their selfinterest at the forefront of their security concerns, the utility of contractors and other
means of private force has given expanded options for national security policy.

Revolution in Military Affairs
The world is currently experiencing a revolution in military affairs in regards to
the use of private force in conflict. The convergence of a number of historical factors
within the cycle of use, as well as the mass proliferation of non-state actors and regional
hotspots since the end of the Cold War has presented a monumental point in the cycle.
As Dima Adamsky notes, the “Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) [is one of] the
terms used for a radical military innovation, in which new organizational structures
together with novel force deployment methods change the conduct of warfare.”98 While
most military revolutions have been driven by technological advances, RMAs are driven
by more than these breakthroughs in technology, with the term implying that the change
in the system will be profound. While the technological component for these changes are
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often important initial conditions, a true revolution depends on a confluence of weaponry,
concept of operations, organization, and the vision of future war.99 In this case, the
revolution is being driven by the later factors, as this convergence of historical factors is
evolving the organization and vision of future development in the mercenary tradition as
the state-based world system is currently changing.
Much as earlier states and groups sought to expand the composition of their
armies from smaller semi-standing forces to include auxiliaries or other supplemental
forces, modern armies depend on private contractors to fill the gaps when they go to war.
The historical factors outlined below are all present in one form or another in the current
state of international security and help to illustrate how this revolution in military affairs
is being driven by an evolution and convergence of historical elements at one single point
in history.
One of the more visible aspects of mercenary and private forces in conflict is the
concept of specialization, as many of the groups through history as well as those in
current conflicts are specialized forces offering focused services. This aspect of the
tradition is one of the oldest, as Carthage and later Rome came to depend on the military
expertise and specialized services offered by foreigners by the third century C.E. This
extended into the use of foederati by the Romans, who served under the foedus, which
was “considered a contract for the service whether the agreement was made by an
individual foederatus or by a group of foederati serving under a leader of some sort.” 100
Henry II’s use of different mercenaries, such as the Welsh and Brabanters, in his
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campaigns allowed for him to choose and build the specialized force he needed for any
particular campaign to be successful.101 It also allows private military forces to advertise
to potential employers the services and unique attributes they could provide, especially if
they present a valuable alternative to untrustworthy or ineffective native forces.
In the past few decades, one of the primary services that private groups have been
contracted out for is personal protection. This use of private force can be traced back to
the Varangian Guards used for the protection of the emperors of the Byzantine Empire.
These men were a mercenary force that was trusted for its loyalty to the throne and
passed this loyalty like an ancestral inheritance to those who came after them.102 Some
countries or political factions still see this as viable options for protection because the
protective details are seen as outsiders with involvement outside of performing their
objectives with driven effectiveness. The legal definition of mercenarism under Article
47 of the Geneva Convention provides protective legal coverage for these groups, as
some are recognized as part of historical traditions, such as the continued recruitment of
primarily Swiss citizens for the Swiss Guards tasked with protecting the Vatican and the
Pope. This historical concept also extends to the private security side of military
contractors, who offer protective services for governments in high-risk areas when the
military or police are either not capable or deployed elsewhere.
Another aspect of the private use of force that has carried on, but become
increasingly contentious in the current security climate, is the payment of outside
countries in support of conflicts. Much as the British went to the German principalities
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and the international market when they hired troops from Hesse-Kassel after failing to
gain support from allies, a number of modern contemporaries have looked to the
international market to help fight internal conflicts. For the states that consider providing
forces on the international market, they may stand in a similar position to the Hessian
state by seeing the military as a principle source of income for economic recovery. 103
This aspect also crosses over into the field of peacekeeping, as United Nations
peacekeeping forces are generally contracted out from participating states to serve in
warzones, which draws from the precedent of state-sponsored mercenarism utilized by
Hesse-Kassel during the late modern period. While regular peacekeeping forces under
the UN are protected under Article 47-Paragraph 2(f) of Protocol I Additional to the
Geneva Conventions, and accepted by the international community, there has been an
increasing privatized nature to operations as for-profit companies seek involvement.104
Decentralized states or those with ineffective military recruitment and
bureaucratic systems could look outwards during drawn out conflicts, particularly to
private groups as a solution to their governance problems. This goes in a similar way to
how mercenaries were conceived as the solution to the problems of feudal levies at the
beginning of the Medieval Period.105 If states with limited economic means or
uncooperative internal populations were stuck in a must-win conflict, outside forces
provide extended options in bringing a conflict to a close. The current conflict in Syria
has begun to shift towards this factor, as the government has struggled at times to fight on
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its own, it sought outside help in the form of both allies and private groups working under
the Syrian banner. This conflict is possibly the clearest representation of current
mercenary use, but due to the constantly evolving nature of the conflict, has been difficult
to track outside group involvement.
Much of the bad name that mercenaries have received comes from an age-old
tradition of how to pay these soldiers. Military leaders quickly learned that buying the
loyalty of both their soldiers as well as the private forces they contracted required them to
sometimes offer opportunities to share loot from conquests. Hannibal gave his
mercenaries this opportunity during the Spanish conquests, and later the specialized
forces he had hired for these campaigns followed him on his expedition to Italy and
allowed him to have a well-trained army that was loyal to him and not other political
factions. 106 This later became a contentious issue as armies accepted the norm of
plundering the countryside of their enemies. In the modern sense of the spoils, private
military companies will sometimes be contracted to perform missions in natural-resource
rich areas, such as Executive Outcomes’ operation in the Soyo oilfields of Angola, as
well as DynCorp’s work in Colombia. This has more recently been displayed in the use
of contractors who were tasked with protecting the Iraqi oil fields until 2012.107
The last of these factors that have attributed to the revolution in military affairs is
the idea that private force is an option in stability operations and humanitarian
peacekeeping. The stability operations side of this goes back to Samuel Annesley’s
proposal to the Mughals of the British East India Company acting as a military and police

106

Hunt. Hannibal. 25.
"Iraq Bans Security Firms on Oil Fields." United Press International (UPI). Last modified March 19,
2012. https://www.upi.com/Iraq-bans-security-firms-on-oil-fields/21471332177942/.
107

55

force on the high seas to protect the trade routes to Europe from pirates in exchange for
special immunities.108 When piracy began to pick back up along the Somali coast during
the 1990s, private companies were hired to provide security to ships traversing the trade
route from the Red Sea to Asia, and this practice has continued. The use of Executive
Outcomes by both the Angolan and Sierra Leone governments for stability operations
gave the world a glimpse of a new aspect of this use of private force, and this aspect will
be addressed further in the next section.
This convergence of historical factors at one single point in history has presented
the world with a remarkable continuum in which the private side of the military industry
has vastly expanded. The radical change in military innovation, specifically new
experimentation with novel force deployment has changed the conduct of war and placed
the world at a monumental point in the cycle of use of private force. It is in this profound
change that a revolution in military affairs is present in the use of private force, and that
the organization of private force has changed dramatically from what has been seen
previously.
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THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

While the cycle was stunted by the creation of the international legal regime
against mercenary use, private military actors have proliferated the global security market
in the past two decades. These actors can be grouped largely according to the degree to
which they are attached to, and motivated by, a cause and the degree of legitimate control
they act under.109 What has developed is a spectrum of violence, that in the current
iteration of the cycle is spread between PMCs, and others in similar fashion to the
condottieri, and national soldiers under the direct control of the state.
In this new proliferation of private actors involved in the international sphere,
attaching a single descriptor to actors assumes they carry the same motivations and is
reductionist in nature as it reduces the multitude of roles that private military actors play
in international security to a debate of the legality of their actions. In looking at these
grey areas of private violence, one can see how this tradition has carried on, and that the
legal definition accepted by the international community does not encompass all aspects
of the larger field of private military involvement in conflict. This section addresses the
main areas in which private military actors have become involved in the international
system and influenced world politics, showing that a changing nature is present in this
involvement.
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The Legal Greys
Today, it can be difficult at times to pinpoint exactly where individual groups,
persons, or companies fall in regards to their place on the spectrum. A number of groups
have been classified in the press as mercenaries in recent years, but due to the complex
nature of the legal definition many of these “mercenaries” are such in name only. These
groups represent the new form of mercenarism and show how the grey areas of the
legality of private violence plays out on the international stage.
During the bloody crackdown in Libya at the start of the Arab Spring that led to
the Libyan Civil War, Muammar Qaddafi turned to outside help before his death in
October 2011. With his concerns of the unreliability of the loyalty of his armed forces,
Qaddafi turned to mercenaries from other parts of Africa, many perhaps veterans of wars
and insurgencies elsewhere in Africa, often from countries he had strong links with.110
One of the groups Qaddafi turned to were the Tuareg, a semi-nomadic Saharan people
who inhabit the large desert swathes of Libya, Mali, Niger, and Algeria. Qaddafi had
previously used the Tuareg during his military expeditions in the 1980s, and when the
formerly trained rebels sought shelter after failed campaigns back home, he provided
shelter and aid.
One reporter had the chance to interview one of these mercenaries after he
returned to Mali from the fighting in Libya.
The man had been on both sides of rebellion, and had fled Timbuktu in the early
1990s, yet chose to fight for Qaddafi against the Libyan rebels, albeit mostly for
money. He was assigned to a Tuareg brigade in the southern town of Awbari
when he went to Libya in 2007, and in exchange for his military service, he was
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granted residency status, paid 1,500 dinars (about $1,300) a month, and his wife
and children received free medical care. His unit covered much of the war and
fought in several battles east of the capital, and later on the outskirts of Benghazi.
He deserted a few weeks after the NATO bombings began and joined other
Tuareg refugees leaving the country.111
It is important to note that this story is just a vignette providing a single first-hand
perspective of these conflicts, with a lack of complete verification, but at the same time
helps to show how the private markets have come back to life as governments struggle to
address internal concerns relating to the use of force.
After Qaddafi’s death in 2011, the civil war did not end, instead turning into a
fractured conflict with multiple sides vying for control of the country. Many of the
groups that had been hired by the regime previously stayed after its fall, seeking payment
for their services. A report by the United Nations noted the increasing involvement of
Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries in Libya in recent years, with involvement in criminal
activities, which has increased the sense of vulnerability and distrust towards the Libyan
National Army in communities in southern Libya.112 “Groups from Chad, Niger, and
Sudan are involved in the Libyan Civil War for a variety of reasons including money,
tribal affiliation, or geopolitical gain. In some instances, groups are fighting in this war in
return, they hope, for future support in their own wars one day.”113 The nature of the
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conflict in the country has forced factions in both the government as well as outside to
seek foreigners as the Libyan people lack the motivation to fight for the root political
causes at the heart of this conflict.
The rise in conflict in the wake of the Arab Spring presented a problem for many
of the Arab countries, who have embraced more aggressive military strategies as they try
to rein in the chaos unleashed by these revolutions. This is also a glimpse into the future
of war, where wealthy nations, particularly in the Middle East, look for military options
that address a wish to wage war, but lack militaries prepared for sustained warfare and
populations with generally little interest in military service.114
With the conflict in Yemen dragging on as part of a larger proxy conflict between
Iran and the Gulf Community, the United Arabs Emirates looked to outside military
support in their attempt to take the country from the Houthis. The New York Times
reported in 2015 that the UAE had secretly dispatched hundreds of Latin American
mercenaries to Yemen, representing the first combat deployment for a foreign army that
had been built over the previous five years.115 What has separated these men from being
prosecuted or charged as mercenaries is a single clause within the international definition,
Article 47 Section 2(e), which states a mercenary is any person who “is not a member of
the armed forces of a Party to the conflict.”116 These men have been incorporated into a
unit within the Emirati military, and operate under government control.
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While many of these men spent much of this time stationed domestically in the
UAE, the have stayed largely because of the money, receiving salaries ranging
from $2,000 to $3,000 a month, compared with approximately $400 a month they
would make in Colombia. Those troops who deploy to Yemen will receive an
additional $1,000 per week, according to a person involved in the project and a
former senior Colombian military officer.117
While the salaries of foreigners may be in a comparable range to that of Emirate citizens
employed by the military, it represents a substantial material compensation and
motivating draw for outsiders.
The side of this case that poses problems for the legitimate side of the private use
of force is the way in which the Emirates recruited many of these former soldiers. Most
of the recruiting in Colombia is done by Global Enterprises, a Colombian company run
by a former special operations commander named Oscar Garcia Batte, who is also a cocommander of the brigade of Colombian troops and part of the force deployed in
Yemen.118 The Emirati officials looked specifically for troops who had operated in
former conflict zones. With their preference for Colombian troops over other Latin
American soldiers, the officials consider the Colombians more battle tested in guerrilla
warfare, having fought against rebels in the jungles of Colombia.119 The changing nature
towards conflicts of an internal or interventionalist nature has drawn states to seek those
with experience in these conflicts rather than attempting to reinvent the wheel and repeat
the same mistakes others had already seen.
Another country that has seen an influx of private actors in recent years is
Somalia, which has experienced ongoing conflict since the Siad Barre government
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collapse in 1991 and the Somali Civil War. A contingent of mercenaries has managed to
carve out a niche for itself in the failed state, initially brought on to combat pirates in the
coastal waters, the mostly South African corps has turned to fighting al-Shabab.120 With
the ever-shifting web of alliances in the country between Islamist militants, pirates, clan
militias, and government forces, the security situation is far from adequate for many
Western nations. In January 2010, the autonomous government of Puntland in the north
of the country contracted roughly 150 fighters and support staff from Saracen
International to train the Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF), a local counter-piracy
militia in their fight against pirates.121 For the next five years, this contingent assisted the
PMPF in these operations and later helped shift towards counter-terrorism after the
African Union peacekeeping force in the south pushed al-Shabab north into Puntland.
The PMPF and its foreign personnel have raised questions regarding the role that
contractors and mercenaries have to play in failed states. The United Nations’ Somalia
Eritrea Monitoring Group raised continued concerns regarding the PMPF and the foreign
military personnel’s participation in combat operations, as it went beyond what the
Security Council envisioned for any foreign force other than the African Union.122 These
concerns come from the fact that the companies working with Puntland are not under a
recognized legitimate command, and this has hindered the autonomous province’s
attempts to bring in more personnel to build up its capabilities. After the departure of
Saracen from the area, the government in Puntland has searched for other contracting
firms to take over Saracen’s role and continue the PMPF training programs.
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This blurring of the lines between mercenaries and other forms of private force
has taken place in other regions as well. For instance, Nigeria hired a number of private
groups in their ongoing fight against Boko Haram to oversee protection of the last
election cycle in the country in 2015. A large part of these men came from STTEP,
under the direction of Executive Outcome’s co-founder Eeben Barlow, who discussed the
role his company played in shaping the aggressive strike force that pushed back Boko
Haram during a seminar at the Royal Danish Defense College.123 The Nigerian
government went shopping for foreign assistance after the United States refused to
provide military equipment, and blocked other foreign military sales, to Nigerian forces
due to human rights violations.124 This shopping included a search for both advisors and
trainers as well as equipment, which led to the hiring of foreign soldiers.
Nigeria’s use of foreign contractors shows the concerns that states have in dealing
with unconventional conflicts that have become part of the norm over the last few
decades. Barlow said in his interview that the initial plan with Nigeria was for his men to
train a team to free the schoolgirls captured by Boko Haram, but this changed to
schooling the largely traditional army in “unconventional mobile warfare”.125 One
diplomat based in Nigeria’s capitol of Abuja told Reuters that the mix of security
personnel was “an incoherent mix of people, helicopters and random kit from all sorts of
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different sources, but there is an element of cohesion from the Nigerian army.”126 While
the Nigerian government insisted that the role of these forces was as technical advisors
for the military, reports that came out of the country gave a somewhat different idea of
how the conflict was playing out. Eeben Barlow even suggested that his men had been
involved in direct combat, as his air units had been given missions in areas to the front
and flanks of the strike force, utilizing a number of aircraft including refurbished Sovietmade Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships.127 In a similar fashion to the Emirati use of
Colombian soldiers in Yemen, the Nigerian contractors have been imbedded with the
larger Nigerian forces, and therefore protected by the same Article 47 Section 2(e) clause
considering them to be attached to the regular armed forces.128
The spread of unconventional conflicts has increasingly drawn countries, such as
those described above, to the private sector to fill voids in military training and doctrine
at a time when security threats are in a period of constant change. And with the
expanding role that private force is playing in all aspects of current international security,
the lines between groups have been blurred as the number of actors increase, much as
there has been a proliferation of other non-state actors in recent years. The confusion of
the private military company with mercenaries comes from the grey areas in which they
operate, as many of the conflicts that the world is experiencing today have no defined
battle lines that allow one to delineate whether a group is operating directly on the front
lines of a conflict.
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It is important to note that private military contractors like Blackwater, DynCorp,
and Triple Canopy are not the same thing as Qaddafi’s mercenaries used in the
Libyan Civil War. “They are bound to follow the laws of the countries where they
are based and operate and, in theory, are only hired for noncombat operations like
guard duty (though that line is often a thin one in war zones). Mercenary forces in
West Africa, by contrast, tend to be informal networks of ex-civil war combatants
rather than formal corporations like Western private military contractors.”129
These informal networks of ex-conflict combatants make up only a small part of the
expanded nature of the private use of force in the current environment and used by states
with little regard for international law.
The same construction of informal networks of ex-conflict combatants that has
been seen in West Africa is also growing in Syria. Russian involvement in the Syrian
Civil War has only blurred the lines further between what has been the accepted use of
private force and mercenarism. The Russian military companies operating in Syria have
been deployed in tough ground fighting alongside Syrian government troops, and as the
Russian government does not officially recognize their existence, it can downplay or
deny any Russian casualties.130 These companies have challenged the Russian
government’s narrative of low-cost conflict, being far more extensive than the Russian
government wants to admit.131 The most prominent of these companies is OSM, known
informally as Wagner, which was one of Russia’s first attempts at trying to create a
private military company. The Russian Defense ministry hasn’t publicly acknowledged
their existence as lawmakers are still trying to create the legal basis for such companies,
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according to Ivan Konovalov, director of a Moscow-based security think tank involved in
the process.132
The company operates outside the regular military channels, but with support of
the Russian government. According to a number of former Wagner recruits, recruitment
and training take place in the small village of Molkino in southern Russia, home to a
Ministry of Defense special forces base, where part of the base had been handed over to
the company.133 One of these men, known as Alexander, had been deployed to Syria,
where the company operated out of the main Russian base on the Syrian coast. He said
that "There were 564 soldiers with me and we were put up at the base …We had two
reconnaissance companies, one air defence company, two assault groups and foot troops,
plus heavy artillery, tanks and so on."134 These units have been used in a number of
battles in Syria, from the army offensive to retake Palmyra to their attack on the Syrian
Democratic Forces base in the Deir al-Zour region, where they came in contact with U.S.
supported coalition forces.135
The use of private military companies and paramilitary groups by Russia in Syria
is part of the larger idea of hybrid-warfare that has been championed since the annexation
of Crimea. These companies have gotten around the domestic ban on private military
companies by “registering themselves as private defense enterprises in Russia, which
guard shopping centers and other businesses, while they take on paramilitary contracts
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abroad.”136 These companies also have operated in conjunction with shell companies
operated by Russian oligarchs close to the Kremlin, and one of these companies, Evro
Polis was added to the U.S. Treasury’s sanctions list in early 2018.
The company was described by the U.S. Treasury Department as a Russian
company that has contracted with the government of Syria to protect Syrian oil
fields in exchange for a 25% share in oil and gas production from the fields. It
said the company was "owned or controlled" by Yevgeny Prigozhin, who is also
believed to be funding Wagner. A rich businessman close to President Vladimir
Putin, Mr. Prigozhin is on the US sanctions list because of his links to the eastern
Ukraine separatists.137
Without direct recognition or oversight by their home government, these companies
represent one of the closest cases of private military force to mercenarism in the current
security environment. Taking part in direct hostilities, these groups may fall under the
Article 47 definition of mercenarism, unless they could prove that their forces are
“nationals of a Party to the conflict”, as recognized under Article 47 Paragraph 2 (d).138

The Private Military Contractor
Following in a long tradition of private force, the new form of the private military
industry is seen most prominently in the private military companies and those who work
for them, the private military contractors. While some of the groups looked at in the last
section are recognized private military companies, those groups were involved in direct
combat operations. Much of the private military industry is based in services outside of
tactical operations and protective security services, but the current security environment
has shifted the role of contractors to an increasingly combat oriented nature.
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Few modern PMCs fit the Article 47 definition of ‘mercenaries’ and, indeed,
spokesmen for such companies insist they rarely engage in combat and provide
military skills only to legitimate, internationally recognized governments. The
ICIJ investigation found that a wide range of companies – from large corporations
that offer military training, security, landmine clearance and military base
construction to start-up entrepreneurs offering combat services and tactical
training – are in what has become the complex and multibillion-dollar business of
war.139
These companies have been supported by the poor conditions of many state militaries in
the developing world. The overall decay of state forces in these regions and rising
challenges have provided this opening for the private sphere, at a time when states are
less willing and less able to guarantee their sovereign autonomy and have increasingly
delegated these tasks to others.140
Erik Prince’s domestic battles with Congress overshadowed the work that his
company, Blackwater did in Iraq and Afghanistan, instead being remembered for a
number of high-profile questionable shootings that took place in the countries. His story
also illustrates the problems that private military companies can face when they attempt
to provide the public with information as to how they operate. For instance, when Prince
testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, he was prohibited under the State Department Worldwide Personal
Protective Services (WPPS II) contract’s gag clause to speak about the contract itself to
anyone other than his legal team or State.141 Prince’s concerns about the gag clause
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contained within WPPS II was also supported by David Isenberg, a policy analyst and
writer on international security issues, who noted the following,
The State Department ordered Blackwater not to disclose information about its
Iraq operations without approval from the Bush administration. The State
Department ofﬁcial, Kiazan Moneypenny, wrote Blackwater vice president Fred
Roitz to “advise” him of Blackwater’s obligations under the State Department’s
contract. Among them was this statement: “All documents and records (including
photographs) generated during the performance of work under this contract shall
be for the sole use of and become the exclusive property of the U.S. government.”
These obligations, according to the contract, exist in perpetuity, not just until the
contract expires. As a result, Moneypenny told Roitz to make “no disclosure of
documents or information generated under [the contract] unless such disclosure
has been authorized in writing by the Contract Ofﬁcer.”142
The nature of limited U.S. government oversight of contracts awarded to private military
companies allowed for the WPPS II contract to lack transparency, while also blocking the
companies themselves from disclosing pertinent information outside the State
Department approved channels.
The prepared statement of Ambassador Richard J. Griffin, Assistant Secretary of
State for Diplomatic Security, from a hearing on this same issue revealed a number of
details relating to the WPPS II contract and the role of private military contractors in
protecting State Department personnel in foreign countries.
After the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in the mid-1980s, private
companies were afforded the opportunity to compete for security contracts, and
the employment of security contractors had become a critical tool for providing
services necessary to protect U.S. embassies, consulates, Foreign Service
personnel and ambassadorial residences in more than 111 countries worldwide.
As a result of the deployment of diplomats to high risk areas, Diplomatic Security
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began using civilian contract personal security specialists (PSS) to fulfill their
priorities.143
The use of these contractors allowed the State Department to meet the increased
protective duties that came as a result of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, while
giving them the flexibility to rapidly adjust the level of security personnel deployed based
on changing threat environments. After the Iraq invasion, the WPPS initiative received
additional task orders, and as DynCorp was no longer able to meet the full mission
requirements, Blackwater USA and other contractors were added to the new WPPS II
contract in 2005.144 The WPPS and other contracts have created a place for private
companies to provide tactical protective services to foreign heads of state, diplomats, and
other high-level officials, in highly volatile environments.
With the growing economic costs of conflict, private contractors were seen as a
solution to lessening the burden on states, much as the United States realized in Iraq. As
of the time of Ambassador Griffin’s testimony, private contractors involved in the WPPS
II contract accounted for annual costs of $570,882,962, with the costs for Iraq by itself
reaching $520 million.145 And of a final note in looking at this sole contract were the
statistics he provided in regards to incidents involving PSS personnel. “From January 1
to September 18, 2007, PSS contractors conducted 3,073 missions in Iraq, out of which
there were 77 incidents that resulted in the use of weapons. These missions occurred
during a period in which there were 54,236 recorded attacks (an average of 6026 per
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month) in Iraq.”146 The ability to utilize private actors in these mission areas meant that
the regular military could be focused on the counterinsurgency mission without having to
spend extraneous resources on outside responsibilities.
In his autobiography, Erik Prince noted that the rules of engagement that had been
drawn up for the company by the State Department under their contract prevented the
Blackwater contractors from firing warning shots when confronted with possible threats
or unidentified armed persons. As part of the Mission Firearms Policy, “Warning shots
are not authorized. At no time will a weapon be fired into the ground or air as a warning
to stop a threat. If at all feasible, other warnings, visible, verbal, and combination will be
used before [the next level of deadly force is authorized]”147 The State Department
regarded this policy as paramount to protecting human life, while acknowledging that
there is necessity in some cases, where there is no safe alternative to using force in the
face of imminent and grave danger.148 This use of force policy helps to illustrate how
even when operating in insurgent environments where there are no clearly delineated
front lines, states seek to separate their contractors from direct combat.
The industry has developed at a rapid pace since the end of the Cold War, and
especially so after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The International Consortium of
Investigative Journalist report used in this research revealed at least 90 private military
companies that had operated in 110 countries worldwide at its time of publication.149
Most of these companies, which provide services that have normally been
associated with a national military force, including military training, intelligence,
logistics, combat and security in conflict zones, are headquartered in the United
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States, Britain and South Africa, while the bulk of their services are performed in
conflict-ridden countries in Africa, South America and Asia.150
The reasoning behind headquartering these companies in a select few nations is partly
due to the mix of defense activities and centers of economic operations. Executive
Outcomes was one of the most prominent early companies that followed this trend. The
company was registered in Great Britain as far back as 1993, in part because “London is
an international centre of informal defense and security activity, arms dealing and war
profiteering.”151 This reiterates the idea that the markets for force have been tied to
economics, and that the historical economic centers have become the new centers for the
direction of this growing industry.
While the United States government historically provided military training and
other services to foreign governments directly, the explosion of the private military
industry in the wake of the Balkans conflict created an upward trend of out-sourcing.
Even as far back as 1995, the Pentagon was looking to lower the direct costs and a report
from the Defense Science Task Board, a standing committee that advises on
technological, scientific, and other issues, supported this. The report “suggested that the
Pentagon could save up to $6 billion annually by 2002 if it contracted out all of its
support functions to private vendors, except those that deal directly with war fighting.”152
One of the most important questions that continues to arise when looking at
PMCs, mercenaries, and the use of private force is the aspect of their motivation. For
many the lure of private gains or profits drive these men and women, as well as the
companies they work for, to work in global hotspots and warzones. While profit is seen
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as a primary motivating factor, at the same time motivations can shift over time. This
was illustrated in the case of the Prussian wing of the Teutonic Order during the
Medieval Period, as their political situation became complicated when they went to war
against Christian Poland, and the institution found it necessary to recruit mercenaries.153
The recruitment need of the Teutonic Order thus emphasized the nature of motivation for
paid men, as chivalry and religion had previously represented a reason for service in one
conflict, but monetary gain later became the main motive for participation.
While many private military companies operate within the industry respective to
their home nations, at the same time they have become multinational in nature. The
spread of conflict over the last two decades has created a security vacuum that states are
no longer able to fill themselves, and these states have turned to this developing private
military sector to fill their unmet security concerns.

Foreign Nationals
While the general idea of mercenaries acknowledges the foreignness of soldiers
involved in a conflict, some foreign soldiers serve states other than their own in times of
conflict as part of tradition backed arrangements and alliances. Section 2(e-f) of Article
47 of the Geneva Conventions Protocol Additional was written in part to proscribe the
accepted use of foreign nationals within the military.154 This protection was developed in
the law to outline accepted forms of noncitizen military service.

153

Ekdahl. "The Teutonic Order’s Mercenaries during the ‘Great War’ with Poland-Lithuania (1409-11)."
In Mercenaries and Paid Men. 345.
154
United Nations General Assembly. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
And Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977. 35.

73

One of the most visible cases of this acceptance in action has been the French
Foreign Legion, which was designed to fight for France in regions where French citizens
were either unwilling or unable to fight. “In its first version, the Legion was seen as a
rough mercenary force that guaranteed immunity from criminal prosecution, as well as a
new life and French citizenship. Now in its third, the official image of the Legion is of an
elite fighting force, compared to the British SAS.”155 This current version of the Legion
has gained renown for its ability to deploy to conflicts in support of the policies of the
French government and handle even the most difficult of missions assigned.
The modern Legion is composed not just of infantry, but also has paratroopers,
engineers, and armored cavalry. The paratroopers are based on the island of Corsica, in
part because they are still not trusted to be on the mainland after being involved in a coup
attempt in 1961.156 While their most recent action was in Mali against al-Qaeda, units
have been stationed in French Guiana and the United Arab Emirates. Of note is that
when a recruit joins the ranks of the Legion, they swear their allegiance not to France, but
to the Legion itself.157 Those that make it through training sign a five-year contract,
which can be renewed, and at the end of three years legionnaires have the option to take
French citizenship. “A long-standing tradition of the Legion is that any legionnaire
wounded in action automatically gets his citizenship, whether or not he completes his
service, becoming ‘Français par le sang versé’ (French through spilt blood).”158 This
tradition of citizenship through blood is questionable when looking at the current legal
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regime, as the tradition offers substantial rewards for combat service, that go beyond
what can be offered to citizens, as regular citizens already have what many in the Legion
seek for themselves as a bonus for their employment.
The Legion’s history is a brushstroke of French conflict, having served the French
government since its conception in 1831. The Legion earned its reputation first in the
conflicts in North and West Africa as France sought to colonize these regions. The
romance of the Legionnaire’s life attracted many well-born men into its ranks, including
King Peter I of Serbia, Prince Aage of Denmark, Crown Prince Bao of Vietnam, Louis
Prince Napoléon VI and Louis II Prince of Monaco.159 Since then the Legion has
provided a serious attraction to young men over the years because in being an elite
fighting force, they have gotten to fight a lot. In the last fifty years, the Legion has played
a role in countless conflicts, in roles from a peacekeeping force in Lebanon to the front
lines of the battle against Islamic extremism in Mali.160
The British also developed a series of units similar in nature to the Legion, known
as the British Gurkha regiments. These units are drawn from the Gurkhas of Nepal and
serve in the British Army as part of a tradition dating back to the British East India
Company. “Gurkhas are currently recruited into the British Army under the ‘Tripartite
Agreement’ reached between the governments of Nepal, India and the United Kingdom
in 1947. They are regular soldiers in the Armed Forces of all three countries. There are
some 3,400 Gurkhas in the British Army today.”161 These units are protected from
prosecution under international law as they are fully integrated into the British Armed
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Forces, as the Geneva definition excludes anyone who “is a member of the Armed Forces
of a party to the conflict.”162 The arrangement between Great Britain and Nepal allows
for the British government to utilize a number of units drawn specifically from a foreign
base of soldiers with a history of loyalty.
While there are other examples of foreign nationals serving in state militaries, the
French Foreign Legion and the British Gurkha Regiments represent how traditional units
have been exempted from the legal definition as a means of protecting legitimate military
units. As part of this concept, it is also common practice for states to provide Loan
Service personnel and training units to work within the armed forces of allied nations,
while also granting resident ‘aliens’ a fast track to citizenship in exchange for service.163

Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Business
Another aspect of note in the current security environment is the development of
United Nations peacekeeping forces since the 1950s. In its current form, peacekeeping
operations require outside states to commit troops to operations under the supervision of
the United Nations. This design has been questioned in recent years, as continued
interventions and a rise in conflict have created a strain on the ability of the international
organization to effectively oversee the protection of civilians in warzones. Governments
have begun to join the calls from the private industry in recommending the possibility of
utilizing private contractors in low-intensity conflicts.
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In early 2002, the British government’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office
released a report titled “Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation.” The
report argued that PMCs could actually aid in low-intensity conflicts and
proposed regulating them as soon as possible rather than leaving them to operate
unchecked. The British press, however, had a field day with the notion that
“mercenaries” would take the place of blue-helmeted U.N. soldiers, and a public
outcry ensued.164
This has led to an interesting cross among peacekeeping and humanitarian operations and
the private military industry. The prevalence of areas of conflict in the past thirty years
has created a need for humanitarian operations to consider private sector security and
defense packages in areas of conflict where they operate.
With the expanding debate on the norm of “Responsibility to Protect”, private
actors have become the guardians of governance when states have suffered a degree of
fatigue from the pace of conflict that the world is now experiencing. This conversation
goes back to the 1990s and the well-publicized case of Sierra Leone’s use of Executive
Outcomes to repel insurgents who had violated human rights on a massive scale brought
the possibilities for privately enhanced security to the agenda, and since there has been
mounting interest in the topic.165
Actors in the private military industry have utilized this opening in the
humanitarian markets for both the benefit of people in conflict zones as well as a way of
showcasing the services they have to offer.
“In seeking to penetrate the market for humanitarian services, profit-oriented
actors are engaged in recycling themselves. For example, doing “humanitarian”
work allows Kellogg, Brown & Root, and DynCorp to emphasize their experience
in rebuilding war-torn societies and economies rather than become bogged down
with accounting for their ties to companies or parties sustaining or propelling
conflicts.”166
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With a number of conflicts in the Middle East on the cusp of coming to a close, this
ability of private actors to emphasize experience in post-conflict reconstruction and other
security domains provides a boost to local economies that can invest in areas other than
military buildups.
One study sponsored by Canadian NGOs in the aftermath of the international
paralysis for the Rwandan genocide went so far as to recommend the creation of a private
NGO army. If governments were spineless, so the argument goes, why not privatize
security so that outside humanitarians can come to the rescue.167 This report, published
by the University of Toronto’s Center for International Studies, revealed that on of the
core dilemmas facing humanitarians stems from the security vacuum engendered by the
emergency itself and the unwillingness of internationally sanctioned, legitimate forces to
address the need for security.168 This dilemma has allowed private firms, especially those
with significant military capabilities to provide physical security to be viewed as possible
options. As humanitarianism has come to include both the physical protection for victims
and aid workers, and as the UN and state-based security resources are often unavailable
or insufficient, the “idea of using private military contractors to provide protection or
facilitate access for humanitarian agencies has gradually taken hold.”169
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DISCUSSION
In the rapidly changing nature of conflict that the world has experienced in the
last two decades, with a proliferation of private actors involved in the international
sphere, there are some important features looking forward. The result of failures of
governance since the end of the Cold War has been conflict and the reordering of the
state system, which has opened up new spaces for private military actors to operate.170
This final section looks at some of the newly developing aspects of private force and
what implications come from this changing nature.

Looking Forward
This breakdown of state sovereignty, from interventions to the proliferation of
non-state actors, as well as questions of citizenship in the new millennium has provided
the opening for the private military industry to grow while also contributing to the
breakdown of previous norms against the use of private force. The changing nature of
citizenship has supported this breakdown, as states have begun offering citizenship in
exchange for services rendered on behalf of the state, both in domestic aspects as well as
militarily. When South Korea went athlete shopping after wining the hosting rights to the
2018 Winter Games in 2011, the country opened up what could potentially be a can of
worms in other fields. “South Korea followed a familiar strategy for host nations that do
not excel at winter sports … It went shopping, hiring a number of foreign coaches and
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granting citizenship to athletes from other countries.”171 While some of the naturalized
athletes had ties to the country and gained dual citizenship, others were essentially
Olympic mercenaries, seeking the chance to win an Olympic medal.172 The drive for
competitive self-interest in both the individuals as well as the state pushed the boundaries
of the nature of citizenship for Olympic glory.
For much of the world, the privatization of war and peacekeeping has already
become an established feature of geopolitical life. For instance, even non-state actors
have looked to the private industry in supporting their goals. With the rise of the Islamic
State in 2012-13, a number of private actors became involved in the brewing conflict in
Iraq and Syria, with many supporting the Islamists in the region. Malhama Tactical, the
world’s first jihadi private military contractor and consulting firm, isn’t an enormous
military conglomerate like many of the companies that work in the security sectors.173
The group has specialized their services to provide training programs that have become
renowned within the region.
While many of their Russian compatriots have become front-line shock troops in
Syria, the men of Malhama Tactical have carved out their own distinct niche
between the worlds of professional PMCs and jihadi groups in Syria. The
company trained fighters from Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in 2016
as they prepared to fight government forces in the urban battlefields of Aleppo.
Malhama Tactical has also taken social media very seriously, and in advertising
its services through Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and other sites has created a
reach that far outsizes the company’s true size.174
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The growth of the company came as an offshoot of the prolonged nature of the Syrian
Civil War, in which a number of private groups have been involved in different
capacities. The outfit’s mixture of extremist ideology with the privatization of war is a
unique and troubling trend, and as Sean McFate points out “A jihadi group doing this is a
new level because if you’re talking about hardcore idealists paying for [military training],
then that’s a milestone of modern warfare.”175 This shake up of the war in Syria has
repercussions for the future of the larger global military-industrial complex, as this new
breed of entrepreneurial jihadi has mixed with the expanding private military industry.
What this expansion of use in the current international security environment has
illustrated is that the world is potentially on the cusp of breaking the cycle of mercenary
use, and a return to the historical norm of the utilization of private force in conflict.
While there is international law to contend with, law at the international level is based in
customary use and acceptance and not legal precedent. This means that if the custom
leans towards greater acceptance of use, there is the possibility that the law and legal
definitions could be left behind as part of an idealist worldview.
The acceptance of Russian mercenary and paramilitary use in Ukraine and Syria
has created another dilemma moving forward for the international community in
addressing the role of private actors in conflict. While economic sanctions were imposed
on Russia for the country’s actions in Ukraine, the general acceptance of their disregard
for sovereignty and paramilitary force represents a failure of the legal regime to hold state
actors accountable. It also represents the possible establishment of a custom or practice
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that could lead to the dissolution of the conventions if other states fail to recognize and
respond to possible uses of mercenaries. Continued acceptance of these actions degrades
the legal regime, as it is not based in legal precedent but recognized custom, and Russia
has recognized this in a similar way to China’s testing of sovereignty in the South China
Sea and their use of Air Defense Identification Zones along the East China Sea.

Conclusions
The blurring of the grey areas between private and public force and the use of
privatized military in increasingly corporate structures has created a new conceptual idea
of how private force fits into the politics of global governance. As the world has seen,
there is a rich historical tradition of the utilization of private military industries and
markets for force. From the auxiliaries of the Classical Period to the PMCs of today, this
tradition has been tied to military advancements, and this will continue into the future.
The consensus definition of mercenarism arrived at by the international
community in Article 47 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions is a modern
construct, based in the ideas of the state-centric world that had been a standard since the
Treaty of Westphalia. The words that have historically been used to describe the
behavior of private use of force are at a point in which they have encountered a new
terminology and actor behavior. As the world looks to the future, the idea of foreignness
is changing, both forward looking as well as moving backwards. The reemergence of
nationalist ideals in the past few years has seen attempts to move back to this state-centric
international system even as greater forces are pushing back.
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The United States pushed the ideals of the capitalist world system during the Cold
War, and what developed out of this was a dependence upon the private sector for
services which has helped drive the resulting expansion of the private military industry.
The debate over the use of mercenaries will continue to center around economics, as the
world has seen the development of a globalized economy where a multitude of actors are
involved, from states to multinational corporations to individuals. The transactional basis
of military service in war, and the costs associated with raising forces has become a
contentious topic of debate among policymakers as technological transformations have
led to new military policies in the West. In the developing world, private force has been
seen as an accepted part of the business of war, and a force multiplier in competition with
regional actors.
As states begin to cede the monopoly on use of force to bodies outside their
control, the development of competitive markets for different military services have
helped drive the revolution in military affairs and the expansion of the use of private
force. As non-state actors have begun to utilize these markets in their competitive selfinterests, there has been a shift in the historical cycle of mercenary use. The world
currently stands at the cusp of a new era in which the expansion of use in the current
international security environment could have a chance of breaking the cycle of use.
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